Fighting Terror In Jenin
In the Jenin operation and on other occasions, local Arabs were forced to drive Òmine-sweeping taxisÓ ahead ofÉ vehicles in areas where Palestinian Arab terrorists were believed to have planted mines, in order Òto reduce landmine casualties.Ó
ÒWhen the troops left, there was little else remaining of the once-busy village except a pile of mangled masonry,Ó The New York Times reported.
Under Emergency Regulation 19b, theÉ government could demolish any house located in a village where terrorists resided, even if that particular house had no direct connection to terrorist activity.
[The government official] later recalled: ÒWhen we thought that a village was harboring rebels, weÕd go there and mark one of the large houses.
ÒThen, if an incident was traced to that village, weÕd blow up the house weÕd marked.Ó
The [government official] defended the practice: ÒThe provision is drastic, but the situation has demanded drastic powers.Ó
The [government official] was furious over what he called the Ògrossly exaggerated accusationsÓ that É critics were circulating concerning É anti-terror tactics É.
TheÉ documents also record discussions among officials of the Colonial Office concerning the rightness or wrongness of the anti-terror methods usedÉ.
[Another official stated]: ÒÉ lives are being lost and I donÕt think that we, from [our] securityÉ, can protest squeamishly about measures taken by the men in the frontline.Ó
[Yet another official] defended the tactics on the grounds that [they]É were confronted Ònot with a chivalrous opponent playing the game according to the rules, but with gangsters and murderers.Ó
All quotes are from ÒHow the British fought Arab terror in JeninÓ The Jerusalem Post; April 19, 2002; Rafael Medoff